1. 平台供应链定价与融资：谁能从电子商务消费信贷中受益？

原标题：Platform supply chain pricing and financing: Who benefits from e-commerce consumer credit?

期刊：International Journal of Production Economics

作者：Jiaping Xie , Lihong Wei , Weijun Zhu , Weisi Zhang

出版时间：2021.12

DOI：10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108283

摘要：电子商务（EC）消费信贷激发了消费活力，从而推动了区域经济增长。提供信用服务的平台可以调整其费用，但是，此类行为对所有参与者的影响仍未得到探索。因此，我们为平台供应链（PSC）构建了一个由第三方卖家EC平台战略消费者组成的博弈模型，以分析定价策略并检查谁最终从信用中受益。我们发现积分会增加产品价格，但不一定会增加平台费用。参与者是否可以从积分中受益取决于参数条件。对于中低端产品的交易，卖家、消费者和整个葡语国家都可以从信用中获利，但对于平台来说却是模棱两可的。当消费者的不诚实厌恶系数较高时，平台有更多的激励措施提供信用;对于卖家和消费者来说，当这个系数适中时，他们更愿意参与信贷服务。对于不诚实厌恶度较高的消费者，社会福利更高。我们广泛的分析表明，一方面，不诚实厌恶的异质性可以扩大消费者和卖家的消费信贷利润范围，但它削弱了平台提供信贷的动机;另一方面，消费者支付的多样性对参与者的效用或利润具有非单调性的影响，但较低的信用支付比率阻碍了低端产品交易的信贷供应，而由于支付的多样性，卖方和消费者可以从中低端产品交易中受益。

Abstract：E-commerce (EC) consumer credit has stimulated consumption vitality which fuels regional economic growth. Platforms that provide credit services can adjust their charge, however, the impact of such behavior on all participants remains unexplored. Thus, we construct a game model for the platform supply chain (PSC) consisting of third-party seller—EC platform—strategic consumers, to analyze the pricing strategies and examine who ultimately benefits from the credit. We find whether the participants can benefit from the credit is contingent upon parameter conditions. Our extensive analyses show that, for one thing, the heterogeneity in dishonesty aversion can expand the profit range of consumer credit for both the consumers and the seller, nevertheless, it weakens the platform’s motivation to supply credit; for another, the diversity of consumer payments has a nonmonotonic effect on the utilities or profits of participants.

2. 什么因素影响了中国消费模式的重塑？——数字包容性与供应链

原标题：What matters to reshaping consumption patterns in China? Digital inclusion and supply chain

期刊：Finance Research Letters

作者：Xiang Ye , Pengpeng Yue

出版时间：2024.01

DOI：10.1016/j.frl.2023.104804

摘要：对消费者需求和行为的分析引起了对家庭金融研究领域中人口过剩问题的关注。本文研究了数字包容性和供应链对家庭消费模式的影响。通过使用中国家庭调查的面板数据集，我们发现数字包容性可能导致总消费量以及不同消费类别的消费增加。我们提供了证据表明，数字包容性和供应链可以改变消费模式，这是由于数字包容性对各消费类别份额的异质性影响所致。我们的研究表明，数字包容性对家庭决策和消费者行为产生了显著影响。

Abstract：The analysis of consumer demand and behavior drew attention to overpopulation in the research area of household finance. This paper investigates the impact of digital inclusion and supply chain on household consumption patterns. Using panel datasets of household surveys in China, we find that digital inclusion could lead to higher total consumption and consumption in different categories. We provide evidence that digital inclusion and the supply chain could alter consumption patterns due to a heterogeneous impact of digital inclusion on shares of consumption categories. Our research indicates that digital inclusion significantly affects household decision-making and consumer behavior.

3.通过供应链融资利用残值提升消费电子产品大规模定制的可持续性

原标题：Enhancing sustainability in mass customisation of consumer electronics with salvage value through supply chain financing

期刊：International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications

作者：Song-ManWu, FelixT.S.Chan, TonySio-ChongU

出版时间：2024.05

DOI：10.1080/13675567.2024.2322515

摘要：消费电子行业在全球向可持续性转型中至关重要。为有效满足客户个性化需求并降低生产成本，电子产品供应商越来越关注大规模定制（MC）和模块化生产。实施对未售出的模块化产品的回购政策（基于其残值）是一种减少浪费的可持续实践。本研究探讨了两种回购支持融资工具，以提升该行业的可持续性，促进MC生产的成功。我们还研究了基于模块化水平的残值和回购政策如何影响大规模定制供应链（MCSC）中的运营和融资决策。研究表明，在两种融资策略下，更高的模块化水平对供应商的利润和最佳产能有积极影响。因此，本研究为在消费电子行业的MC背景下提升可持续性实践以及优化运营和融资决策提供了宝贵的见解。

Abstract：The consumer electronics industry is crucial in the global shift toward sustainability. To meet customers’ personalised needs efficiently and reduce production costs, electronic product suppliers increasingly focus on Mass Customization (MC) and modular production. Implementing a buyback policy for unsold module products with salvage value is a sustainable practice that reduces waste. This study explores two buyback support financing tools to enhance sustainability in the industry, enabling successful MC production. We also investigate how the salvage value based on modularity level and the buyback policy impact operational and financing decisions in the Mass Customization Supply Chain (MCSC). The research reveals that a higher modularity level positively impacts supplier’s profits and optimal capacity levels under both financing strategies. Consequently, this study offers valuable insights into elevating sustainability practices and optimising operational and financing decisions in the context of MC within the consumer electronics industry.

4. 区块链技术在供应链金融中用于企业信用信息共享

原标题：Blockchain technology for enterprise credit information sharing in supply chain finance

期刊：Journal of Innovation & Knowledge

作者：Kangning Zheng , Leven J. Zheng , Jeffrey Gauthier , Linyu Zhou , Yinge Xu , Abhishek Behl , Justin Zuopeng Zhang

出版时间：2022.12

DOI：10.1016/j.jik.2022.100256

摘要：供应链金融信用系统中存在信用数据障碍，如信用记录不完整、虚假信用信息以及信用数据安全性较低，这使得整个融资链的信用系统难以有效运作。新兴的区块链技术可以通过更高的完整性、去中心化、透明性、安全性和可靠性，帮助改善信用报告能力。为了解决信用调查数据量大和隐私保护的问题，我们提出了一个基于区块链的模型，用于实现供应链中共享交易信息的访问控制和管理。我们的模型采用共识机制来解决大量信用调查数据和隐私保护的问题，并实现了共享数据链的访问控制和管理。在该模型中，数据存储在云服务器上，并通过代理重加密方法进行共享。模型的数据结构和工作流程专为供应链金融的具体应用设计。嵌入的区块链技术有助于构建开放共享的参考架构，并建立全生命周期的监控机制。目前的区块链共识机制安全性较低，资源消耗较大，因此设计一个新的共识机制以服务于信用调查系统尤为重要。在本研究中，通过改进共识机制可以实现区块链的数据共享和可追溯性，从而帮助改善现有的信用调查服务系统。我们的研究结果有助于优化现有的供应链金融信用系统，并提高供应链融资的效率。

Abstract：Credit data barriers, such as incomplete credit records, false credit information, and low security of credit data, exist in the supply chain financial credit system, rendering it difficult to support the closure of the whole financing chain's credit system. Emerging blockchain technology can help improve credit-reporting ability through greater integrity, decentralization, transparency, security, and reliability. Aiming to address the problem of extensive credit investigation data and privacy protection, we propose a blockchain-based model to realize access control and management of the shared transaction information in the supply chain. Our model adopts a consensus mechanism to solve the problem of large credit investigation data and privacy protection of credit investigation data and realizes access control and management of the shared data chain. In our model, data are stored on the cloud server and shared with the proxy re-encryption method. The model's data structure and workflow are designed to facilitate specific applications in supply chain finance. The embedded blockchain technology helps build the open shared reference architecture and establish the entire life cycle of a monitoring mechanism. The existing blockchain consensus mechanism has low security and a large resource consumption; as such, it is particularly important to design a new consensus mechanism to serve the credit investigation system. In this study, blockchain data sharing and traceability can be realized by improving the consensus mechanism, helping to improve the existing credit investigation service system. Our findings help optimize the existing supply chain financial credit system and enhance the efficiency of supply chain financing.

5. 社交影响下预售策略对三层级供应链的影响

原标题：The Impact of Advance Selling Strategies on a Three-Echelon Supply Chain in the Presence of Social Influence

期刊：Mathematical Problems in Engineering

作者：Qianyu Niu, Feng Yang

出版时间：2020.04

DOI：10.1155/2020/9823731

摘要：由于新产品的质量在事前是不确定的，社交影响在新产品的扩散中起着重要作用。一个重要的问题是如何通过促销策略来扩大公众对新产品的消费体验认知。本文讨论了在社交影响下，上游企业在面对战略性消费者时推出新产品，预售策略对三层级供应链的影响。我们将这个问题建模为一个斯塔克尔伯格博弈，并提出了一个双预售折扣模型。此外，我们还考虑了当零售商提前下订单时，预购行为对融资策略的影响。本文得出了以下几个结果：(i) 在第二阶段，消费者的效用随着先行者数量的增加而提高；(ii) 当消费者变得更加耐心或者先行者对模仿者的影响力增加时，上游企业将提供更大的预售折扣。此外，当消费者的折扣因子降低或先行者的影响强度增加时，总需求将会上升。然而，较高的创新水平会促使企业设定较高的预售折扣。我们还得到了在创新水平变化时，总需求迅速增加的条件；(iii) 双预售折扣模型与没有预购的情况相比，产生了帕累托改进的结果，尽管它不能协调供应链。最后，我们扩展了模型，分析了在约束预定订单数量的最低订单量条件下的双预售折扣模型，并表明这可以使企业增加利润。我们还确定了上游企业应设置最低订单量限制的条件。

Abstract：As the quality of new products is ex-ante uncertain, social influence plays an important role in the diffusion of a new product. An important question is how to expand public knowledge about consumer experience with a new product by using promotion strategies. This paper discusses the impact of advance selling strategies on a three-echelon supply chain when upstream enterprises launch a new product facing strategic consumers under social influence. This problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game, and a two-advance-selling-discount model is presented. Furthermore, we consider the impact of advance purchase behavior on the financing strategy when the retailer places an advance order. Several results are obtained: (i) the consumers' utility in the second period is increasing in the number of predecessors. (ii) Upstream enterprises will provide deeper advance selling discounts when consumers become more patient or predecessors have a greater influence on imitators. Moreover, the total demand will increase when the consumer's discount factor decreases or the impact intensity of predecessors increases. However, high innovation levels will drive enterprises to set high advance selling discounts. We also obtain the condition under which the total demand increases quickly as the innovation level changes. (iii) The two-advance-selling-discount model yields Pareto-improved results compared with the case where there is no advance purchase, though it cannot coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we extend the model to analyze the two-advance-selling-discount model with a minimum order quantity constraining the precommitted order quantity, and we show this can allow the enterprises to increase their profits. We also determine a condition under which the upstream enterprises should put a constraint on the minimum order quantity.

6. 具有电商金融的战略性双渠道定价博弈

原标题：Strategic dual-channel pricing games with e-retailer finance

期刊：European Journal of Operational Research

作者：Yan Nina , Liu Yang , Xu Xun , He Xiuli

出版时间：2020.05

DOI：10.1016/j.ejor.2019.10.046

摘要：中小企业（SMEs）在接触消费者和获得充足资本以支持其生产和运营过程中常常面临障碍。电子商务平台（以下简称电商零售商）由于拥有渠道优势以及供应商销售、库存和信用的丰富交易数据，能够为中小企业提供在线分销渠道和在线融资服务，帮助其进行分销并缓解资金限制。本文分析了由一家资金受限的供应商和一家提供金融服务的电商零售商组成的双渠道供应链中的定价竞争。供应商可以通过电商零售商的在线渠道或其自身的线下渠道销售产品。如果供应商资金紧张，电商零售商会向其提供融资服务。我们研究了供应商在面临资金限制时，在与电商零售商进行横向或纵向竞争时的双渠道中的均衡价格及其相关的最优数量和利润。研究发现，电商零售商提供的金融服务是一种增值服务，融资带来的额外利润能够抵消在线分销渠道的收入下降。电商零售商的融资服务可以增加市场份额，同时也惠及供应商。通过比供应商更早公布价格决策参与纵向竞争，电商零售商能够占据先发优势。此外，我们还展示了电商零售商金融服务的价值，并分析了各种与融资、运营和消费者相关的因素对定价和渠道结构的影响。我们为电商零售商和资金紧张的供应商提供了如何利用电商零售商金融服务来优化双渠道结构并做出最佳定价决策的指导。

Abstract：Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) often face obstacles in reaching consumers and obtaining sufficient capital for their production and operations processes. Owning channel advantages and rich transaction data regarding suppliers' sales, inventory, and credits, e-commerce platforms (henceforth, e-retailers) can offer online distribution channels and online financing service for SMEs to facilitate their distribution and alleviate their capital constraints. This study analyzes the pricing competition in a dual-channel supply chain consisting of one capital-constrained supplier and one e-retailer providing finance. The supplier can sell her products either through the e-retailer using the online channel or through her direct offline channel. The e-retailer offers finance to the supplier if she is capital-constrained. We examine the equilibrium price and the associated optimal quantity and profits in dual channels when supplier may face capital constraint and compete with e-retailer horizontally or vertically. We find that e-retailer finance is a value-added service for e-retailer and that the increased profits generated from financing offerings can offset the lowered revenue in the online distribution channel. E-retailer finance can increase market share, which also benefits the supplier. Participating in the vertical competition through announcing pricing decisions earlier than does the supplier can help the e-retailer seize the first-mover advantage. Further, we present the value of e-retailer finance and examine the impact of various financing, operational, and consumer-related factors on pricing and channel structure. We also provide guidelines for e-retailers and financing-constrained suppliers to utilize e-retailer finance to optimize their dual-channel structure and to make optimal pricing decisions.

7. 做得更多是否等于做得更好？负责任的供应链管理与企业声誉之间的关系

原标题：Is doing more doing better? The relationship between responsible supply chain management and corporate reputation

期刊：Industrial Marketing Management

作者：Stefan U. Hoejmose , Jens K. Roehrich , Johanne Grosvold

出版时间：2014.01

DOI：10.1016/j.indmarman.2013.10.002

摘要：负责任的供应链管理（RSCM）能够通过避免负面媒体关注和消费者抵制来保护企业的声誉。此外，RSCM还可以提升企业的声誉，使其成功获得商业合同并进入新的市场细分领域。本文实证研究了：(i) 负责任的供应链管理实践在多大程度上受到保护企业声誉的驱动；(ii) 负责任的供应链管理是否能够提升企业声誉，从而为企业带来竞争优势。研究基于跨越出版、科技、饮料、烟草、金融和家居改善等七个行业的主要和次要数据集。我们发现强有力的证据表明，企业通常是出于保护企业声誉的愿望而实施RSCM。同样，研究还表明，负责任的供应链实践能够提升企业声誉，并因此带来竞争优势，尽管这种联系并不如RSCM与声誉保护之间的关系那样深刻，并且在不同产业之间存在显著差异。这些发现对市场营销理论，尤其是对工业市场营销人员具有重要启示，他们越来越被期望实施负责任的供应链实践。

Abstract：Responsible supply chain management (RSCM) can help protect a firm's corporate reputation by shielding it from negative media attention and consumer boycotts. RSCM can also enhance a firm's corporate reputation, which allows firms to secure business contracts and penetrate new market segments successfully. This study empirically examines: (i) the extent to which responsible supply chain management practices is driven by a desire to protect corporate reputation; and (ii) whether responsible supply chain management can enhance corporate reputation and thereby generate competitive advantage to the firm. We draw on primary and secondary datasets across seven firms, spanning the publishing, technology, beverage, tobacco, finance and home improvement sectors. We find compelling evidence to suggest that firms often engage in RSCM due to a desire to protect corporate reputation. Similarly, we find empirical evidence to suggest that responsible supply chain practices can enhance reputation and thereby create competitive benefits, although this link is not as profound as the relationship between RSCM and reputation protection and there are significant variations across industries. These findings have significant implications for marketing theory and, in particular, industrial marketers, who are increasingly expected to implement responsible supply chain practices.

8. 信息不对称对供应链中的订购和产能决策的影响

原标题：The effect of information asymmetry on ordering and capacity decisions in supply chains

期刊：European Journal of Operational Research

作者：Tal Avinadav , Noam Shamir

出版时间：2021.07

DOI：10.1016/j.ejor.2020.11.004

摘要：我们重新审视了供应链中在信息不对称情况下的合同问题，并强调了一些此前未被报道的重要特性。在我们的设置中，报童模型中的零售商拥有关于需求的优越信息；零售商可以通过承诺提前采购一定数量的产品来向供应商传达这一信息。以往的研究集中在确定能让供应商相信需求较高的最低采购量。在本研究中，我们认为，在某些情况下，零售商可能会选择采购比这一最小区分量更大的数量，因为提前采购的承诺可能为零售商提供激励，使其为整个市场的产能提供融资——这是在没有信息不对称的情况下零售商可能不会做出的选择。这一结果对供应链的效率和消费者福利具有重要的影响。我们的分析显示，与完全信息情况下相比，信息不对称可能导致市场中更高的产能，因此，信息不对称可以缓解双重边际化问题，从而提升消费者福利。我们还进一步比较了零售商向供应商传递需求状态的激励（产生区分均衡）与零售商隐瞒其私人信息的激励（产生混合均衡）之间的差异。这表明，信息不对称不仅影响供应链中的订购和产能决策，还对供应链整体效率和消费者福利有潜在的正面影响。

Abstract：We revisit the problem of contracting under asymmetric information in a supply chain and highlight a few important properties that have not been reported previously. In our setting, a newsvendor retailer is endowed with superior information about the demand; the retailer may signal this information to the supplier by committing to purchasing a certain quantity in advance. Previous research has focused on characterizing the minimum quantity that convinces the supplier that demand is high. In this work, we claim that in some cases, the retailer prefers to order an even greater quantity than this minimum separating quantity, since committing to an advance purchase can result in incentives for the retailer to finance the entire capacity in the market-a choice that the retailer may not adopt absent information asymmetry. Such an outcome carries important implications regarding the efficiency of the supply chain and consumer welfare. In particular, our analysis shows that asymmetric information can result in a higher capacity in the market than the complete-information case; thus, asymmetric information can mitigate the double-marginalization problem and result in higher consumer welfare. We further conduct a comparison between the incentives of the retailer to signal the demand state to the supplier (resulting in a separating equilibrium) and the incentives of the retailer to withhold her private information from the supplier (resulting in a pooling equilibrium).